dictionary.com: morality: The quality of being in accord with standards of right or good conduct. belief: Mental acceptance of and conviction in the truth, actuality, or validity of something Now, having said that, how does it apply? One must BELIEVE that one's MORAL STANDARDS are a TRUTH in order for one to have faith in one's morality. (Because if you don't have believe in the verity of your own morality, everything falls apart. "The center cannot hold!")

I should just explain that I brought Stina here.

[Stina] (Hi.) Isn't that circular? Faith in one's morality is the same thing as believing that it is true. To argue on the other side for the moment, one can lead a perfectly moral life while having no such faith in the existence of any objective standard. I have preferences about the way I want to live, and about the way I would like other people to live. But whether I regard these preferences as no more than preferences, or as perceptions of moral truths, in either case I can't prove to anyone else that they should behave the way I think they ought to. The most I can do is argue that living in such and such a way will benefit them in their terms.

[Stina] Welcome! But no - if anything, you must believe that your moral standards are normative, not that they are true. As I argue, moral standards are not the kind of things that are "true". A moral statement is like an imperative. You wouldn't say that "Go to your room!" is true any more than it is false. It just is. The point is that moral statements ultimately boil down to injunctions of that form, even if they are disguised as statements of fact. So "X is wrong" is really "Don't do X!" in disguise. Why? Because to put it another way, statements of morality are things that you can obey or disobey. You can react to a fact or a proposition in any number of ways, but you can't obey or disobey it. Moral claims aren't like that - they invite - indeed demand - obedience in some way. And an injunction like that is not the kind of thing that can be true or false. The task for the believer in objective morality is to explain in what sense an injunction can be "objective", if it is not in the same sense that a fact can be objective. This is why I disagree with Darren. I'm not saying that moral statements aren't propositions because we don't understand how they can be, and that a greater intelligence than ours could see how they are. I don't think that they are propositions at all, and it doesn't matter how transcendent you are. A hyper-intelligent pan-dimensional being wouldn't ask what the truth-value of a moral statement is, any more than it would ask how heavy a shadow is or what colour 1815 was, because it recognise that to do so is to make a category mistake, that is, to treat something of one category as if it belonged to another. I think that those who ask whether a moral statement is true or false, or assert that it is, are making just such a category mistake.
[Raak] It seems to me that the question of who can recognise moral truth, and how, is something of a distraction from the main question, which is what "moral truth" is in the first place, and how it can exist if the points I've made are valid. If a moral statement does not express a proposition at all, let alone a true one, then what does it express? Taking for granted that there are some people who can recognise it, what are they recognising, quite apart from the question of how?

[Breadmaster] Well, as I said, I suspect we may have to agree to disagree on that. I see no problem with asking what colour 1815 is, or indeed with the proposition "1815 is green." There may not be many ways of reasoning with it, and certainly it might be hard to prove it one way or another (short of formalised synaesthesia!) but I don't happen to believe that those issues prevent it being true or false. If it's a category mistake, then no number/year has a property equivalent to colour, and the statement is false. It's still a proposition.

You said earlier that "ought" does not reduce to "is." Fair enough, but you then say "X is wrong" is really "Don't do X!" in disguise, or, to put it another way, "One ought not X." Surely you're self-contradicting here. At any rate, I fundamentally disagree that just because (if we allow this, which I wouldn't) "X is wrong" may be written "don't do X", that it must always be treated as "don't do X," and that the "X is wrong" form must be disregarded.