rosie] Samantha told me that she had been looking forward to seeing you playig with your bone , and was most disappointed not top have a chance to blow it herself.

(st d) V. Good. I am tickled. I hope she realises that "Trombonists Do It In Seven Positions", as they say. Fairly routine stuff for her, no doubt. My nextdoor neighbour is called Samantha, precisely 28 years younger than me and at present heavily pregnant, not through any action on my part, which in the long term is probably a good thing.

*Cross Posted* - and a day later than usual as I was away from my inbox yesterday.
Dear I'm Sorry I Haven't A Clue Mailing List Member, We bring you news of a recording of the programme that is taking place at the close of this year's Edinburgh Festival on Monday 29th August (Bank Holiday Monday) at around 6.30pm at the Pleasance Grand. It's a single recording (normally we record two programmes) so the whole event should last around an hour and a half. Tickets go on sale at the Edinburgh Fringe Box Office from Thursday 9th June. They are priced at £7 each. The venue seats 700 so there won't quite as many tickets available as for recent recordings. Again, you'll need to book early to secure a ticket. The Fringe Box Office telephone number is 0131 226 0000 and the website address is www.edfringe.com If this show is of interest, I doubt you'll be able to get through before 9th June, so make a note in the diary to call on Thursday 9th June.

BM] Just to carry on this discussion about law - as it is quite interesting - If the govt brings in ID Cards, and makes it compulsory to carry them, then would you think that people would carry the card only because of "practical" reasons, or do you think that people would feel a moral obligation to do so, as it was law ? Also I would imagine that there would be a large group of people who would feel a moral obligation to NOT carry the new cards, in order to register their opposition to the new law. How would these people figure ?

Living, as I do, 15 minutes walk from the Fringe Box office, I shall attempt to buy them in person on Thursday 9th rather than listen to an engaged tone for 3/4 hour. Wish me luck.

Except that, allegedly, the box office doesn't open until the following Monday. I'll pop into the society office sometime and ask them...

[St D] Well, I would feel a moral obligation to carry them as it would be the law, but clearly I don't know how widespread such a view would be. For example, in New Zealand it is illegal to drive without having your driving licence on you, so I always had it with me even though there was no "practical" advantage to this. As for the conscientious objectors, I personally don't think their position would be defensible. To my mind it is justifiable to break a law if doing so would bring about more good or cause less harm than keeping the law. But in this case, following the ID card law would obviously do no harm - it would not harm anyone if an opponent of the law did carry their card, and it would benefit no-one for them not to carry it, other than to register their protest at the law. But they can register that protest just as effectively whilst obeying it, which surely means that there is no moral argument for breaking the law, and I would like to think that most people would agree that in such a case one should obey the law rather than break it. I hadn't imagined that there would be people who would break such a law purely because they oppose it, but I don't really understand this mentality that some people seem to have that civil disobedience is the best way to change the law. They seem to think that if you personally don't agree with a law then that gives you carte blanche to break it. Often when they are interviewed on TV they make vague references to "democracy", as if that entailed libertarianism.

(Breadmaster) Driving licences are for people who are permitted to drive. ID cards are for people who are permitted to . . . . . . (fill in as appropriate). Why should I have to carry an ID card everywhere. After all, I know who I am. Disobeying the law while harming no-one else is a very good way to get the law changed.

[Bm] What do you propose as a means to change the law? In the case of ID cards, what would appear to be a law which is unproven to fulful its primary stated purpose (combatting terrorism) and which is proposed to have its costs bourne by the unwilling individual?

Sorry, that second thing wasn't a question. I'm not sure it even qualifies as a sentence...

[Rosie] I don't see why disobeying the law, in an example such as this, would be any more effective at changing the law than not disobeying it. Why would this be more effective than writing to your MP, going on a march, and all the other legitimate means that we have? Surely in the absence of any other considerations, one should obey the law, and so if disobeying it would not achieve anything, as I doubt that it would in this case, one should obey it.
[rab] Wouldn't it make more sense to say that if the law is indeed ineffective as well as burdensome, that is an argument for changing it, not for disobeying it, and if it does indeed prove counter-productive, the government would change it themselves irrespective of whether people disobey it or not?

Yes but the question I asked was "What do you propose as a means to change the law?" which was not intended as an argument to disobey it. It was a question asking, erm, how you would go about getting a law you didn't like changed. I think.

BM] The poll tax comes to mind, as a law which was eventually abolished because so many people broke it.

(BM) The best strategy for someone who doesn't like the idea of ID cards (to the exclusion of all other considerations) would have been to vote for the Tories. Whatever their manifold defects they do not have the authoritarian frame of mind of New Labour. If they'd got in, of course, the taste of power may well have changed that - it happens with all governments and they need to be constantly watched. They'll try to tell you an ID card is for your benefit. It isn't. It's for theirs. Disobey this lousy pointless law if it comes in, even if just for kicks, or self-esteem.

[rab] Well, like I said, write to your MP, or to the relevant government minister, and if you feel strongly enough start a campaign and go on marches. As for the poll tax, surely that was abolished because there was such a tide of feeling against it and such massive protests, not because people disobeyed it. People disobeying it and its revocation were two effects of the one cause, namely the unpopularity of the law, rather than cause and effect, I'd say.

Sorry - I missed that part of your response to Rosie. To be clear I don't advocate disobedience as a means towards change, but I also don't advocate slavishly following ridiculous regulations laid down by someone else "just because". There has to be a good logical reason, and because "someone else said so" doesn't count.

BM] Something like 10 million people got summonsed for not paying the poll tax, though most just got fined. The credit-checking companies stopped including poll tax debts in credit-worthiness checks, because so many people had debts that it would have made their whole system unworkable. That refusal to pay and the campaigns against it were two sides of a coin - I don't see how you can seperate them out.

fior me, the challenge will be to carry it but in such a way that it is useless for its intended purpose. Perhaps I'll have it laminated so that it doesn't get damaged. And then won't fit in any of the readers, oh dear.

Having fully identified myself, may I draw your attention to the spare games slot? What shall we have?

How about another limericks game?
More seriously, how about a revival of Carpe Diem?

Hmm, not convinced by Carpe Diem, though I can't really think of anything else. Anyone got something fresh and new?

I've got this salad.

I'd still like a game of Gallifrey Crescent.

Bob the dog (or someone posing as him) seems to have seized the day with Sabogy, but the ruleset is unexplained and the opening move is, to say the least, combative.

I'd like a Headlines game... I know Stevie has just started one on Orange, but that's people-based. How have we played them before? Like Cheddar Headlines?

It was possibly a lurker that created the game sometime before half six this morning

[pen]I say go for it, end Sabogy and create the game.

[pen] Haven't we got The Cheddar Valley Gazette running on Orange at present?

...more accurately known as Holmes Raided In Mystery Dawn Swoop.

[UK] Oh. I thought that was mystery-based, which is never my thing, so I hadn't looked. Something had to be done to get rid of the sweary thing though - the same game forced me to bed on Saturday night. Feel free to fold the newspaper game if you don't want it. Fold... geddit? ;o)

How about playing the Flower Game, as mooted by Bob in ...so help me God? :)

I don't think we've ever played Commie Crescent, which might be interesting. The winner is the first to redistribute Mornington Crescent to all the other players.

BM] Your example of driving in New Zealand illustrates my point. Of course there is a practical advantage to carrying your driving license whilst driving. This practical advantage is that if stopped by the Police, you would nat have to go through the painful process that may arise from your not carrying it. This is my point with ID cards - one might carry it purely for teh "practical" reason that it is law and it is easier just to obey the lwa and thereby avoid any ridiculous consequences that may arise from not carrying it. But there is no MORAL reason why one should carry an ID card. I think what you fail to realise is that although our moral obligations often comply with legal obligations, many people do not believe that something is a moral obligation simply because it is a legal obligation. This is especially true when it comes to minor traffic violations. I must say that I find your blind obedience quite frightening, in a 1984 kind of way.

StD] I know this is an argument where no-one will convince anyone else, but I have a problem with individuals deciding what they are and are not morally obliged to do. I'm sure Harold Shipman believed that he was morally right in relieving these old people of their suffering (and I know that's a reductio ad absurdum, but it is the other end of the same continuum). As for minor traffic offences, the roads are provided and maintained by highway authorities/the government for people to use in cars under certain conditions. Thus I would equate asking people to carry their licence with insisting that cars should be taxed and insisting on speed limits with insisting on insurance or insisting that people should not be under the influence.
On identity cards I would take the French view, that they should be provided cheaply and for all, but that it should not be obligatory to carry one (most French people do, but that's for convenience). However, the government shouldn't argue that they will be good for the country and for security and then try to recoup the entire cost of providing them in their cost.

[INJ] Individuals do make their own moral decisions, Shipman included. If you're suggesting a moral principle that laws ought to be obeyed, that's your principle and you're welcome to live by it, but it's still up to everyone else whether they decide to adopt that principle or not.

[INJ] "Cheap" identity cards? Whatever the upfront fee, the entire cost of introducing cards will be borne by the taxpayers. That is where governments get their money from.

[INJ] The only real problem with insisting individuals align their morals with the law is how you go about enforcing it. After all, surely that's what the law is intended to do anyway! When it comes down to it, I don't think it's possible to force someone to adopt a belief - and what are moral values if not beliefs?

[Raak] At the risk of hounding you from server to server on the topic of redistribution, they do, but not equally. :) [Darren] I think I'm happy with the law as a means of controlling behaviour more than belief. It then isn't necessary to believe wholly in the moral force of the law, but to simply act expediently or calculatedly in relation to it. If the law is any good (and sometimes it is very good), its drafters will tend to make some rough calculations about the behaviours it will provoke and try to ensure those give the moral outcome desired.

[Raak, Darren] You're right of course, and I think I've said something that I don't really mean. I suppose I have misgivings that people (including myself), have a tendency to advance a 'moral high ground' defence for something that is really much more to do with convenience. This weakens the force of real, more important, moral stands.
[Cost of ID cards] If there are advantages in things like security, reducing benefit fraud and the like, then the cost of ID cards should be at least partly borne by those budgets. If you don't do that then in effect it's an addition to the government tax take - I'm arguing that it should be neutral or that the cost should come out of general, means-based, progressive taxation..

[Projoy] I wasn't intending to depict the law as a controller of belief, so much as a set of moral values which are supposedly held by the majority of society (or, more accurately, by the government) but not necessarily by individuals. In this sense, the law's connection with belief is that it's a formal statement of the way the government and/or society believes we should behave.

By way of light relief, and with Pen in mind...

[Btd] What the f ...?

'pen' has a small 'p'

[Chalky] She should see the doctor about that.

Or at least have the decency to use the proper receptacle for it.

I really think its a fascinating discussion. I must say though ImNotJohn, that there si really no-one else at all who can decide what I am morally obliged to do and not do do. They can give an opinion, they can throw me in jail, they can make me a saint or a pariah, but they cannot really decide what I feel morally obliged to do or not do. Anwya - I have to rush off now, but I do think its fascinatiing - and if yo ugoogle "Moral Obligation Obey Law" you find a lot of papers written on teh subject and it appears that great minds in this area have always and no doubt will alwyas disagree on what the answer is....

[Btd] Blimey. Thank you very much. I know we talked about CdB and LiR, but what the hell did we say? He's a scary-looking man, anyhow.

[pen] He looks very smug, doesn't he? Always very smug. I wonder what on earth he can find to be smug about.

It's not a bad name for a game, but I wonder what it would be?

attempts to bogey a sabotage come to mind, but I don't know what that is either.

[St D] I wasn't advocating "blind obedience"! On the contrary, I said that there may be times when one is morally obliged to break the law if doing so would bring about more good or prevent more harm. But I do think that if this is not the case one is morally obliged to obey the law, simply from the fact that laws are made by the society which we are part of and from which we benefit. Read Plato's Crito for a rather more extreme defence of this (Socrates argues that one should never break the law, even an unjust one, for this reason).
[Darren] I think most philosophers, at least, would say that a moral value is not a belief, because you believe a proposition (eg "There is a God" or "Tony Blair is a jolly nice chap") but moral values are not really propositions. They may look like propositions (eg "It is wrong to murder") but this is simply a linguistic quirk. The reason is that moral statements don't simply express a fact, they prescribe an obligation - they state what you should do, rather than how things are. This is why many people think that expressions of morality are basically the same as expressions of taste, so that "Murder is wrong" is no more a statement of fact - and therefore no more a belief as such - than "This picture is nice". This probably isn't really very relevant to the discussion, though. I'm just feeling pretentious. But is it objectively true that I am?

's a bogey, innit, like, summin 's up yer nose.

I would agree with Raak in that it is a shortened phrase almost a slang, it really originates from the estates in Glasgow, in their misunderstanding of what a bidet is for. As in
young child, "Wha's tha da?"
Jimmy "Sabogy"

BM] Fair point - sorry I missed that. I still feel that I side with teh school of thought that says we are not morally obliged to do anything really. Especially not simply obey laws because they are laws. I generally do and will obey laws, I hasten to add.

[St D] So if we are not morally obliged to do anything, would you say that if, for example, you found yourself on a desert island with an extremely annoying companion, and if (by hypothesis) there were no way for your actions ever to be discovered or punished, there would be no moral reason for you not to murder him and make kebabs? I should probably add that I'm inclined to agree that there is no such thing, really, as objective moral obligation, so when I talk about the obligation to obey laws I'm really just speaking for myself. But I'd be interested to see how you answer this one.

[BM] I don't agree with you when you say moral values are not beliefs. When they state what you should do, that's just another way of saying they state how you believe you should act. It's a matter of semantics, and at any rate I do agree that it's probably not enormously relevant. Incidentally, are you claiming that beliefs express fact? That's patently false. The difference between a belief and a fact is that, whereas a person may hold both to be true, the former need not be objectively true. Person A believes there is a god. Person B believes there is no god. How can both their beliefs equal objective fact at the same time?

(BreadM) The moral force behind not murdering your extremely irritating (but presumably unthreatening) companion is that you yourself would not like to be kebabbed. That is an absolute but the example you give is easy to evaluate. Not everything is quite so straightforward.

BM] No I wouldn't say that at all. What I (think I am) saying is that there is not really, in my view, a moral imperative to obey a law simply because it is a law. I wouldn't kill someone by who was annoying for kebabs, even if I would never be found out, purely because of I suppose, the "moral reason" that you shouldn't kill people. As it so happens, there is no "practical" reason not to kill the annoying person [assuming that you aren't worried about being lonely or whatever], as the fact that there is to be no come back on it at all has removed the practical reason to not kill someone - because it is against the law and you may end up in the nick. What I think is that the moral obligations that a person feels rest pretty much the same irrespective of what laws exist or are being prepared or are being updated.
If a new law is brought in saying "You can't smoke in pubs" for example, I would not smoke in pubs because I was being asked not to by the Landlord, not because it was against the law. If I was in a pub where the landlord and all the customers were smoking, then I would smoke too. This actually happened in California a year or so ago - having slowly got used to not smoking in bars, I was in Lone Pine (nr Death Valley) and was about to light up at the bar. I stopped myself and said "Forgot I was ion California, sorry" and the barmaid laughed, pulled out an ashtray and said "This is Lone Pine, Honey".

[Darren] I don't think Bm was suggesting that beliefs were facts, more that they are ideas about what is. Ideas about what ought to be are a whole other class. I think it's overoptimistic to hope that any system of law will be an encoding of some sort of consistent moral philosophy. This is not least because there are usually contradictory premises even where the law is set out from first principles, leaving Supreme Courts to scratch their heads and deliver hung verdicts. The law represents just an accretive set of some morals some people had at some points in history (which is not to say it's arbitrary, just tremendously compromised by the practical realities of how it is made). My naive working assumption is usually that whoever made the law did so for the general benefit, so it's better to have obedience as the default position. There are also laws (such as speed limits) where an arbitrary line was drawn which could as easily have been drawn somewhere else (there's nothing intrinsically safer about 70mph over 71mph), but the benefit for all in drawing a line is that it gives a common framework, arbitrary though it may be, that enables drivers to make consistent calculations about risk and behaviour - so the law is worth obeying on a "what if everyone broke it?" sort of basis, I think. [Bm] I'm with you: no objective force for morals. One can easily chip away any moral principle (if you're willing to take an unpopular position) by questioning the source of its authority. You can chip away at facts in this way too, usually by resorting to that undergraduate nuclear option, the epistemological question, but it does strike me as harder.

(Projoy) It's an awful long time since I was an undergraduate, so what is The epistemological question? And, presuming you answer, how do you know that?

The epistomological question is "Ah, but how can you know anything?" and one usually sees it used when its invoker has lost the argument. :)

[Projoy] I doubt anybody really has a consistent moral philosophy. I certainly don't. I'm not entirely sure your view of laws is any different from mine. We just worded it differently. At any rate, I also agree there is no objective force for morals. Oh, and the loser in invoking The epistemological question is probably the highbrow equivalent of Godwin's Law.

I used to think that morality was no more than personal preference, delusionally experienced (as our perceptions usually are) as external to oneself. What else could moral statements be, since they are not demonstrable matters of fact? These days I'm not so sure, mainly due to personal experience that I don't think I can describe. A third possibility is that they are indemonstrable matters of fact, which is C.S. Lewis' position in "The Abolition of Man", which I mentioned here recently. They can be learned only by certain experiences, but the experience cannot be communicated. They cannot even be demonstrated to oneself, only lived by or not.

[Darren] Projoy answered it for me really, but yes, I meant that beliefs are about propositions, which may be true or false. A proposition is the thing that, if it is true, is a fact. And I do think that moral views are not beliefs, because they are not about propositions. It may be linguistically acceptable to say "X is wrong" but I don't think that that expresses a real proposition, because it's not something that can really be true or false. It's a commonplace now that ought cannot be reduced to is, because there is something about a prescription that is not simply a factual statement - it is, in a sense, an order. Quite what that non-factual element is, though, is a matter of debate.
[Rosie] But what has what I would like got to do with it? On the contrary, one might say that my own desire to remain unkebabed is all the more reason to kebabify the other chap, for fear of his doing it to me first (since he finds me just as irritating as I do him, and no wonder). Of course, I don't know if you're supported St D's position as originally expressed that we are not morally obliged to do anything, or aiming to refute it.
[St D] So then in fact you do think we have moral obligations? I thought you meant that we don't at all - presumably you meant only with regard to obeying the law? In which case I apologise for misunderstanding you.
I almost simulposted with Raak, and it's funny because I think I'm increasingly drawn to the view he says he now doesn't share, which is odd because normally you'd think we'd be the other way around!

[Projoy] My rule of thumb is that when someone questions the possibility of knowing the truth of anything, there is some specific truth they are trying very hard to ignore.

[Bm] What view are you moving away from, if I may ask?

[BM] I understand your argument now. A belief is a proposition which must be objectively true or false, whereas a moral value is based on something subjective... I do see where you're coming from, but I'm still not entirely comfortable with it. It seems almost a logical positivist approach to belief - that something can only be a belief if its accuracy can be objectively determined. So what of the question of whether there is a god? Is there a way of determining if there is a god or not? If not, then belief in a god can't be a belief. If you disagree with this, why is it less acceptable for "X is wrong" to be a proposition than "there is a god"? If you agree with it, then is religion in general a set moral values rather than a set of beliefs?

I meant "a set of moral values" rather than "a set moral values" of course.

Ooh, it's getting gritty now...
[Raak] I didn't really have a view to move away from, to be honest. This is partly because I always found ethics by far the dullest area of philosophy and never formally did it. I suppose the view I'm moving away from is the view that there is any sense in which "X is right/wrong" is objectively true or even objectively anything. It may be possible for it to be objectively something, but I'm not sure what, and if it's not truth then I'm not really interested.
[Darren] Oh no, I'm no logical positivist, a position I think is pretty silly (for the uninitiated, this is the view that something can be true only if it can be shown to be true). I don't say that we can't know the truth value of ethical propositions, therefore they can't be true. Rather, I say that they are not propositions at all. They are not stating facts (or falsehoods) of any kind. Thus they differ from the proposition you give of "There is a God," which I certainly think (a) cannot be shown to be either true or false, but (b) is either true or false. That's an unverifiable proposition, but "X is wrong" isn't really a proposition at all, even though it looks like one. Part of the reason I think this is that I cannot imagine how a world in which "X is wrong" is true differs from a world in which "X is wrong" is false other than that one difference. But I think that if a proposition is true it must express something about actual things actually in the world - that is, facts are, as it were, parasitic upon things. So for "There is a God" to be true there would have to be an actual God, whilst for it to be false there would have to be none. But I don't know what kind of "thing" would have to be different for "X is false" to be a fact or a falsehood. Thus it's not merely that we don't know whether it's true or not, I don't think it means anything at all to say that it is true - that is, it's not the sort of thing that can be true. If you follow me.

[Bm] (I assume that your last "X is false" was a misprint for "X is wrong"?) According to the view I am suggesting without necessarily being committed to, what would be different for "X is wrong" to be a fact or a falsehood would be that those with moral insight would agree that X was or was not wrong. That doesn't advance things much, but moves the question to "How does one acquire moral insight?" And also "How can people claiming different moral insights reach agreement on moral facts?"

I just want to correct "those with moral insight would agree" to "those with moral insight would see".

[Raak] Yes, the typesetters did me wrong. I think you're going to have to elaborate somewhat on your suggestion, though. If the sole difference between "X is wrong" being true and false is whether those with moral insight think it is, then that doesn't seem to me to be a very strong claim. Are you basically saying that things are right/wrong because most people (or most appropriate people) think so? But clearly this is quite different from normal propositions - for example, "Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system" isn't true or false by majority opinion, and neither is "There is a God." Normally we think of propositions being things that people recognise the truth or falsity of, rather than things that they determine the truth or falsity of. Alternatively, if you think that those with moral insight are in fact not determining rightness/wrongness but recognising it, then that begs the question on what grounds these people see that X is right or wrong. Do they just "see" it with Enlightenment-style infallible conscience, with no further explanation? This is quite apart from the problem you suggest yourself, which is how to recognise those with authentic moral insight, and how to deal with the problem of disagreement over morality.

[Raak] I know you're not fully taking the position that there are naturally some people with greater moral authority, but it's interesting to compare with the libertarian worldview which (without knowing much about it) I would have thought would rely on the idea that morality is personal and subjective.

As you say, it doesn't advance things much to suppose there are those with moral insight, since it's basically a deferral of the question about the source of any objective morality. For "God", read "the enlightened". You thus can't move on to asking "how does one acquire moral insight?" without committing to the belief that there is such a thing, so a leap of faith would seem to be required. Definitely not one I'm prepared to make based on my experiences.

[Bm] Moral propositions (in the view I'm setting out) aren't true by virtue of being believed, they are true objectively, and those able to see them believe because they see them. How do they do this? Well, how do you (for example) recognise the ordinary physical objects around you? There's no "how" involved that we can say anything useful about (at least not until non-invasive brain scanning technology improves in resolution by many orders of magnitude). The same for moral perception. How people get to be able to have moral perceptions is more answerable in the here and now: upbringing, spontaneous revelation, or learning from enlightened people.
[Projoy] If there is such a thing as moral authority at all, then some people will have more of it than others. I don't know where that "naturally" comes from: if it's an elite, it's one that anyone can join, the same as authority about temporal matters. There is indeed an act of faith involved: the faith that there are objective morals. But there is also an act of faith involved in the perception of physical truths. The main difference between the two is that most people's physical senses function at a high enough level that it is easy for all to agree on simple physical statements, while the same degree of consensus is lacking in the moral realm. One difference, at any rate. Another is that people are much more attached to their moral judgements than their physical ones.

Upbringing, spontaneous revelation, learning from enlightened people...or arriving at them by working them out oneself.

[Raak] True, there needn't be a "naturally" although of course in the case of perception of reality there are real reasons why some people are naturally better at intuitive perception of reality than others (a minor example is perfect pitch). We don't necessarily know the nuts 'n' bolts reasons for these differences but it is something we can say with some confidence based on the level of agreement about reality and different people's success at perceiving intuitively that which we can independently verify: I sing a note. JLE says it's A, I play an A on the piano and it corroborates his statement. But crucially his doing this does not allow me to learn perfect pitch from him. If accurate perception of some kind of objective morality is a higher order skill of this type, it's then a reasonable speculation there probably is a hierarchy of people's ability to perceive moral absolutes.

In the case of morality this strikes me as considerably wilder speculation than making the same statement about perfect pitch. This might be for anthropic reasons, of course, but if so your line of reasoning becomes rather depressing for those who don't sense an objective morality, since it suggests they are missing something big and are never going to perceive it! (Slartibartfast would say, "Oh, no, that's just paranoia. Everyone in the Universe has that.")

...and of course something else follows from that line of reasoning, which is that if one is to have the best system of law, there are objectively people who are qualified to legislate and indeed, such a thing as government with objective moral force, whom we lesser mortals are insufficiently equipped to judge!

(Projoy) If intuitive means "knowing without thinking" then absolute pitch is intuitive. I have it, and always have had, and I can't quite understand why anybody who's had access to a musical instrument at an early age and is musical hasn't got it. It is, in my view, only a form of memory, motivated by a strong interest in the subject. Maybe its rarity is due to it having little evolutionary or survival advantage, unlike colour recognition. It's not much help, especially these days, to know that ex-GWR steam engines whistle in A flat (1st leger line above the treble).

(Projoy) Just seen your addendum. There are indeed people who are qualified to legislate, not because they have any superior sense of morality but because they understand the nuts and bolts of legislation and its effects (sometimes). Furthermore, we have asked them to do it, this being some sort of democracy.

[Projoy] But there are people who don't sense morality. They're highly exceptional: we call them psychopaths. Not sensing the objectiveness of morality or not believing in its objectiveness are different, and don't disqualify anyone from sensing morality. As for legislation, possessing sound moral judgement does not give anyone a right to order other people around. Indeed, the delusion that "if only everyone acted as I think they ought to the world would run a lot better, therefore they should be made to act like that" is a pretty clear sign of moral immaturity.

[Rosie] I think we did this discussion before and established that color recognition isn't really analogous to pitch recognition (because we can point at something and say "yellow", even when it's in shadow in a way that lowers the frequency to something we'd normally call brown). In a similar way, I hear a note in the context of a tune and can say "submedian" even if I can't say "Bb" or whatever it happens to be. Perhaps there is a window of opportunity very early in life to acquire perfect pitch (I'd be interested to know if there's any evidence that people who learn an instrument from, say, 4, are x times more likely to have perfect pitch than those who only start at 7, say), but from my perspective, I certainly don't think it's related to level of interest. An old music teacher of mine used to talk about an academic colleague of hers who was so envious of others' perfect pitch that he tried to learn it. He would play a note on the piano at the top of the college building then walk to the basement, brushing aside all attempts to engage him in conversation, all the while humming the note under his breath until he reached the piano in the basement. I understand he never achieved his goal :). [re: legislators] Yes, but good legislators can do their job in the absence of any moral principles. If someone told them to draft a law that compels everyone to kill their neigbour they could do that just as easily as drafting an obviously moral law. What Raak and Bm and Darren and I are speculating about is whether there are people objectively better qualified to frame the moral basis of legislation.

[Projoy] I don't think that's what I'm speculating about. (For what it's worth, I don't think any one person is more qualified to frame the moral basis of legislation than any other. To err is human, after all, and it strikes me that in order to define morality one must be infallible and therefore above the reach of mere morality. Am I making any sense or just rambling incoherently?) What I'm speculating about is whether morality and belief are the same thing. I suspect I may have to agree to disagree with Bm over that, because I'm still not convinced by his argument. The thing is, I'm reminded of Hofstadter, where he was talking about how a rock smashing a space probe may seem like a waste to us, but to a sufficiently intelligent race it may seem obvious that that's the most appropriate thing that can be done to it. The point I'm making is that just because humanity can't objectively decide whether X is wrong or right morally, it doesn't mean there isn't an absolute answer to the question which could be answered definitively by an intelligence with greater insight than ours, with rock-solid logical backup and an appropriate set of side-effects. Again, maybe that makes no sense at all. Part of the reason for saying all this is to expose the underlying thoughts which are running through my mind as I write these posts just to see if anything falls apart when they're examined more closely.

The connection with logical propositions is that, as it seems to me, Bm's definition of belief as logical proposition implies that something becomes a moral value if it can't be stated as a logical proposition as far as human intelligence is aware, whereas I don't draw any distinction simply on the basis of the limit of human awareness. Perhaps that's the difference between Bm's position and mine. Perhaps I'm being needlessly mystical about the whole thing.

Can someone have a more-well-tuned moral compass than others? Certainly. But was Gandhi's sense of morality "nature", and Siddartha Guatama's sense of morality "nurture"? (That is, a matter of learned experience vs. innate sensibility.) And of course, those who are inclined to seek public office are generally the least suited to holding public office! [Rosie] I would think that perfect pitch cannot be learned, because even though the cochlea can pass along a B flat vibration, the brain still has to define the vibration. [Raak] Psycho/sociopaths are not lacking in a sense of morality. In fact, they can be highly moral people when it applies to actions against themselves. Their issue lies in the fact that they do not understand the concept of "other", as in, there are other people out there who do exist; and this lack of understanding regarding "otherness" evidences itself to the rest of us as a lack of morality. Which I think is a good argument for morality itself being a learned ability (in that it requires an observer to define Moral and Not-moral).

dictionary.com: morality: The quality of being in accord with standards of right or good conduct. belief: Mental acceptance of and conviction in the truth, actuality, or validity of something Now, having said that, how does it apply? One must BELIEVE that one's MORAL STANDARDS are a TRUTH in order for one to have faith in one's morality. (Because if you don't have believe in the verity of your own morality, everything falls apart. "The center cannot hold!")

I should just explain that I brought Stina here.

[Stina] (Hi.) Isn't that circular? Faith in one's morality is the same thing as believing that it is true. To argue on the other side for the moment, one can lead a perfectly moral life while having no such faith in the existence of any objective standard. I have preferences about the way I want to live, and about the way I would like other people to live. But whether I regard these preferences as no more than preferences, or as perceptions of moral truths, in either case I can't prove to anyone else that they should behave the way I think they ought to. The most I can do is argue that living in such and such a way will benefit them in their terms.

[Stina] Welcome! But no - if anything, you must believe that your moral standards are normative, not that they are true. As I argue, moral standards are not the kind of things that are "true". A moral statement is like an imperative. You wouldn't say that "Go to your room!" is true any more than it is false. It just is. The point is that moral statements ultimately boil down to injunctions of that form, even if they are disguised as statements of fact. So "X is wrong" is really "Don't do X!" in disguise. Why? Because to put it another way, statements of morality are things that you can obey or disobey. You can react to a fact or a proposition in any number of ways, but you can't obey or disobey it. Moral claims aren't like that - they invite - indeed demand - obedience in some way. And an injunction like that is not the kind of thing that can be true or false. The task for the believer in objective morality is to explain in what sense an injunction can be "objective", if it is not in the same sense that a fact can be objective. This is why I disagree with Darren. I'm not saying that moral statements aren't propositions because we don't understand how they can be, and that a greater intelligence than ours could see how they are. I don't think that they are propositions at all, and it doesn't matter how transcendent you are. A hyper-intelligent pan-dimensional being wouldn't ask what the truth-value of a moral statement is, any more than it would ask how heavy a shadow is or what colour 1815 was, because it recognise that to do so is to make a category mistake, that is, to treat something of one category as if it belonged to another. I think that those who ask whether a moral statement is true or false, or assert that it is, are making just such a category mistake.
[Raak] It seems to me that the question of who can recognise moral truth, and how, is something of a distraction from the main question, which is what "moral truth" is in the first place, and how it can exist if the points I've made are valid. If a moral statement does not express a proposition at all, let alone a true one, then what does it express? Taking for granted that there are some people who can recognise it, what are they recognising, quite apart from the question of how?

[Breadmaster] Well, as I said, I suspect we may have to agree to disagree on that. I see no problem with asking what colour 1815 is, or indeed with the proposition "1815 is green." There may not be many ways of reasoning with it, and certainly it might be hard to prove it one way or another (short of formalised synaesthesia!) but I don't happen to believe that those issues prevent it being true or false. If it's a category mistake, then no number/year has a property equivalent to colour, and the statement is false. It's still a proposition.

You said earlier that "ought" does not reduce to "is." Fair enough, but you then say "X is wrong" is really "Don't do X!" in disguise, or, to put it another way, "One ought not X." Surely you're self-contradicting here. At any rate, I fundamentally disagree that just because (if we allow this, which I wouldn't) "X is wrong" may be written "don't do X", that it must always be treated as "don't do X," and that the "X is wrong" form must be disregarded.

[Bm] Well, I'm arguing, or rather exploring the hypothesis, because I think there's some mileage in it, that moral statements are propositions. They are truth claims about the moral universe. The normative consequence -- you should do that which is good, and avoid doing that which is evil -- is a secondary matter. Someone who perceives the moral truth does not have to bludgeon himself with "shoulds" into acting accordingly, he will do so as an inevitable conequence of seeing the truth, the same as he will step out of the way of an onrushing car when he perceives it, and for the same reason.

(Projoy) You can't learn absolute pitch, or unlearn it either, which is one reason I play the trombone. All the other blowing instruments in a jazz band are transposing and if I read a C I don't want to hear a Bb, and certainly not an Eb (alto and baritone sax). Trombone is written in bass clef, which results in an impressive stack of leger lines for the high notes. If it's on a space and "in the stratosphere" it's a C (octave above middle C). Otherwise it's a D (hopefully a Db) which I can just about do with a following wind. Why don't they just go into treble clef? Because they don't. Maybe not all trombonists are pianists.

Never trust a Vogon when it comes to directions.I've been stuck in the plorii system for the last 8 months!!! But now I'm back...........

To answer my own question re: perfect pitch, I googled a paper which says: "we also observed a significant association between AP and the age at which an individual first began playing music. For the AP group as a whole, the mean age of starting musical activities was 5.4 ± 2.8 years, whereas, for the non-AP group, the mean age was 7.9 ± 3.2 years (P < .0001)."

Also, it says, perfect pitch is far more common in Oriental people.

[Projoy] But -- as they also point out, I'm glad to see -- the causation could easily run the other way.
[Bm, Raak, Darren, et al] This is a *great* discussion; one from which I am really learning.

I had perfect pitch as a child, but not being a musician, I've never used it, and the skill seems to have decayed. I just tried whistling a middle C, and it turned out to be a tone flat. But maybe I'm channelling Baroque pitch, concert pitch having been invented to boost the E-string industry.

[widey] But we've been here all the time :o) Good to see you back!

I'm not surprised you can't whistle Middle C; you'd need a head the size of a space hopper to do that. Do you mean an octave higher, or maybe even two? As to baroque pitch, I once heard Handel's Messiah sung to the accompaniment of old instruments, as it turned out. "Why are these buggers in D flat?", I was muttering until the penny dropped. Baroque pitch is about 3/4 of a semitone down on concert. (A = 422 or so).

What CdM said, first of all - it's this sort of discussion, as much the games, that keeps me coing back to the Morniverse. I do have a couple of questions- probably daft ones, but I'll lob them in anyway

Raak] If moral statements are propositions - objective truths like gravity or the earth being round - then shouldn't we as a species have discovered some of them by now? And how exact are they? Do you mean general statements like the Ten Commandments, or more specific ones? And if they are objective truths, then surely they admit no exceptions? Which is somewhat problematic - the proposition likely to get the greatest assent is probably "You shall not kill", but if pushed, most people would admit to believing some caveats to even that one (just wars, self-defence, etc).

Darren] There's a convention called Pantone numbers in printing, where you tell a printer the exact shade of green you want by quoting the Pantone number. Inside that convention, the statement that "1815 is green" is objectively true or false. That convention works because everyone who uses it agrees that the rule-set exists, and that the person or people who defined the rule-set have the right to do so. What I'd question about the idea that "1815 is green" in the wider world is - how do we know that the rule-set exists, and who made it?

Lastly (and without stopping this discussion) could I advance the moral proposition that CdM has won the current round of AVMA, and that he should tell us the answer and set another one?

[Irouléguy] Here is one account of the moral Way (although I think it leaves out a significant area, one's responsibility towards oneself). Does the law of gravity admit of exceptions? Yet iron ships float, planes fly, and Voyager is escaping the solar system, and for well-understood reasons. Anyone touting a verbal formula as the truth, whether in the scientific realm or the moral realm, has already fallen into error.

[Irouléguy] Even if an objective rule-set exists, it doesn't need a maker, unless you want to be creationist about it, or you want to take the view that all mappings are abstract constructs formed by the human mind, in which case there's no such thing as a natural rule-set, but nor does there have to be a single named maker as such things can be built up over time. At any rate, there is no need for "1815 is green" as a logical proposition to say anything about the wider world (the meaning and nature of which we could debate for many centuries), because, apart from the fact that we could be talking about all kinds of symbolism, the proposition in itself is a kind of proposed mapping between 1815ness and greenness. It doesn't have to be objectively true or false, but what we do have to be able to say is, if we had enough data, we could determine whether it was true or false. In other words, we don't need a rule-set, because the proposition itself, if true, implies the existence of one. If false, however, it says nothing about the existence or non-existence of a rule-set, although if there is no rule-set, the proposition is not a proposition because it cannot be true or false. In the same way, by saying "X is wrong" as a proposed mapping from the concept of X to the concept of wrongness, we don't necessarily say there *is* an objective mapping of actions to moral evaluations, but for "X is wrong" to be objectively true there must be such a mapping. However, just because we can't tell objectively at this stage whether such a rule-set may or may not exist, that doesn't mean that "X is wrong" stops being a proposition. I think Breadmaster's position, in this sense, is that such a rule-set is impossible and so by definition no proposition which purports to use it can have meaning, because it is neither true nor false, and therefore fails to qualify as a proposition. If it can be shown that there is definitively no rule-set, then I agree with Breadmaster that such things aren't propositions. I'm just not entirely convinced that such a rule-set is impossible, even if it is beyond human knowledge. How far this gets us into the question of morality I don't know!

Actually, I said above "There is no objective force for morals," so I've contradicted myself. OK. Let me put it like this, if there is no objective force for morals (as I clearly thought a couple of days ago!) then Breadmaster is correct and my arguments have fallen apart.

The funny thing is, this discussion has made me question in myself whether I really believe there is no such thing as objective morality, and I can't really say for certain one way or the other. Within the human world, I don't think there is anyone who has in themselves, or has determined in some other way, an objective sense or code of morality. So, I suppose I'll have to fall in line with Breadmaster's view that moral values are not logical propositions. Well done Bm! Certainly made me understand my reasoning a bit more.

[CdM] So having perfect pitch makes you Oriental! I always suspected this was the case! :)

[Raak] I understand that you're suggesting your personal insights into this come from experiences which you can't describe here, so you are rather hamstrung in terms of pursuing this hypothesis of objective morality, at least in this forum. But I am inclined to ask you some skeptical, pedantic questions, such as what a "moral universe" is, how you think the whole thing might work (in just the way you can't find here). If a moral intuiter steps out of the way of immoral actions because they perceive risk to themself (as in your car analogy), that is one thing (but implies self-interest being at the heart of morality, which would make it subjective, surely?); if a moral intuiter senses moral danger, what sort of process do you speculate might be going on in their heads that doesn't appear to go on in mine? Further, if you have some experience of this, maybe - without having to talk about the experience - you could tentatively specify an example of an objective moral rule...?

[Projoy] I knew someone was going to say that.

[Darren] Yayy! Thank you. By the way, I inexplicably can't access this page (alone of all in the Morniverse) from work any more, it seems, which is why I fell silent. Bear in mind that even moral statements are not propositions, it does not necessarily follow that they are not universally applicable. "Don't murder!" could be normative for everyone even though it does not express an objective fact. Perhaps there could be "objective commands". But what those could be, and how they could be, I don't know, and explaining them is a task for someone else.
[Raak] You surely know that your gravity analogy doesn't apply! Floating ships and space probes aren't "breaking" the law of gravity any more than I am when I hold my leg in the air before taking a step. Rather, the law of gravity is simply one of many physical laws which are inter-related, or interact. But that's beside the point. More to the point is that even the list you link to contains much that is arguable. I, for example, don't set much stock by "duties to ancestors" even though the average Confucian might regard it as a central moral imperative. There is nothing that has been universally accepted as a moral imperative, and even if there were, it wouldn't prove anything other than that people all thought it was right. The most such things can show is that human beings have evolved - either biologically or socially - to think that certain things are right or wrong, presumably because those who didn't think this didn't develop stable societies. Thus most people think that murder is wrong because if they didn't they wouldn't have survived. We can therefore explain moral imperatives - or at least their basic outlines - quite adequately in a historical or evolutionary way, without needing to posit that moral views express some kind of "truth" about the world. And the sorts of questions that Projoy asks indicate that there are big problems with the view that they do. After all, there are many people who think that there are moral facts, but no-one seems able to agree what they are. Is abortion a fundamental right or is it one of the blackest crimes there is? The fact that people disagree doesn't prove that there isn't a matter of fact at dispute, of course, but it does raise the question - how, even in principle, could the dispute be settled? What "evidence" (even if in practice it could not be collected) would prove it one way or the other?
Another point that might be relevant - the Tao website states that "For those who do not perceive its rationality, even universal consent could not prove it." Well, I'm afraid I don't perceive its rationality. I may perceive its utility or practical application. But David Hume pointed out that morality isn't to do with rationality, and vice versa - he said something like "There is nothing irrational about my preferring the destruction of the entire universe to the scratching of my finger," and he was right - such a preference may be morally wrong in whatever sense you have of the word, or it may be highly unuseful, but it's not, strictly speaking, irrational.

[Projoy] Self-interest is at work in stepping out of the path of a car, but that doesn't make it subjective in any useful sense. Everyone will step out of the way of that car, except only children who have not yet learned that it is dangerous, the drug-addled, and the suicidally depressed. This is only subjective to the degree that every thought we have is subjective. What is objective is that the car will kill you if you don't get out of the way. Opinions and wishes are irrelevant. Reality is like the Terminator: you can't reason with it, you can't argue with it. You only have power to choose your actions, not their consequences.
       (Repeat earlier caveat that I'm taking this horse out for a ride to test its legs.)
       Thus it is with morality. The enlightened do good and avoid evil, because, from their point of view, the first person that good acts benefit and evil acts harm is oneself, consequences as undeniable as traffic. It applies to everything from not mugging old ladies for their pension money to getting out of bed in the morning. The idea has a long pedigree, e.g. Socrates and the Buddhist canon (and in a debased form in the Religions Of The Book, where all the consequences are deferred to a supposed later life, despite the statement by one of their prophets that "the kingdom of heaven is within you"). It doesn't give instant answers to all questions, any more than the laws of physics will immediately tell you how to build a kilometer-tall skyscraper.

[Bm] You give two arguments that undercut each other: that there are no universally accepted moral principles, and that universally accepted moral principles arise for evolutionary reasons. You can't have it both ways, but I'll ride this horse over both of them anyway.
       No scientific truth is universally accepted either, if you define "universally" narrowly enough. There are, nonetheless, substantial areas of agreement on moral issues that can be found throughout all civilisations. That doesn't prove they are true (as Lewis himself says), merely that they exist. Perceiving their truth is a separate matter.
       I could take the evolutionary explanation as evidence on my side -- the consequences of right and wrong action are exactly your presumed evolutionary pressures. Not getting run over is also evolutionarily adaptive, but that does not mean that personal decisions and the laws of physics have nothing to do with it.
       How do you perceive the utility of the Way? If it is useful to follow the Way, what is it useful for? And what in turn is that useful for? Utility offers no foundation. Likewise rationality. Look hard enough, and all attempts to find foundations lead only to an infinite regress. Ideas can only justify ideas in terms of other ideas. Morality is about actions, and actions cannot be deduced from thoughts, any more than an ought from an is.
       Hume also claimed not to see causation, but he wouldn't have survived to write his books if he hadn't dodged horse-drawn carts now and then.

[Raak] Maybe Hume was just very, very lucky.

[Raak] Your supposition that evil acts harm the doer is where it all falls down for me. Sort of repeating Bm's point, but a car will run people down according to the laws of physics, which can be reliably shown to operate universally (at least as far as we can observe), but mugging someone for their pension cannot be shown universally to have negative effects for the individual (unless you start invoking some unknowable afterlife or karma or whatever). In other words, some people get away with breaking moral rules, in just the way that a car can't get away with braking the rules of physics in order to save a life. There is merely a certain probability that a system of law exists that will make mugging disadvantageous to the perpetrator. This is not 100% (in fact taking human history as a whole, I'm tempted to speculate it is less than 50%). Is there any real evidence whatsoever to the contrary?

You might come back with the argument that the fact people get away with breaking moral rules is irrelevant to the truth of those rules, but if so then the truth of those rules is irrelevant to us if we are searching for objective standards, since the rules cannot be shown to have reliable consequences, and therefore do not admit of predictions.

I also think that rational suicide is a very interesting example in the objective/subjective debate, because it's always struck me as a very interesting example of higher-order thinking successfully overruling all the lower-order evolutionary thinking with which we come pre-installed. If our sense of objective morality rests on self-preservation, why would it admit of contradiction in this way?

Raak] (Following on from Breadmaster's reply) It's also the case that all of these moral traditions arose in societies whose rulers did not follow them, yet all of these moral traditions preached acceptance of those rulers. "Thou shalt not kill" actually become "Thou shalt not kill unless thou art the state". If these are absolute moralities, shouldn't the rulers obey them? And if the rulers are immoral, shouldn't the moral organise to get rid of them and impose the rule of the moral?
My second objection is that I don't see what makes these an objective rule-set, as opposed to the many other moral precepts you could have instead (for example, sexual equality, environmentalism).
Lastly, illustrating Projoy's point, I'm reminded by the weather of the Belloc (?) poem:
The rain it falleth on the just
And on the unjust fella
But more upon the just, because
The unjust stole the just's umbrella
One of the lessons of experience (both direct and indirect) is that crime or acting immorally very often does pay.

Darren] You're right to pick me up on the creationist implication of my argument (not at all what I think). I was with your argument all the way until "In other words, we don't need a rule-set, because the proposition itself, if true, implies the existence of one." I think that's circular reasoning, because the truth or otherwise of a proposition can only be tested by reference to a rule-set.

[Irouléguy] Not circular, but certainly flawed. We don't need, and nor can we infer the existence of, a universal rule-set, however we do need a rule-set which covers at least the special case(s) covered by the proposition we know to be true in order to test it, as you say, but we can say (and this is what I was getting at) that if the proposition is true, then such a special-case rule-set must exist, even if its only rule is the true proposition itself. Bringing in the special-case rule-sets, a proof that there is no universal rule-set doesn't discount the possibility of a special-case one which covers only finitely many possibilities, and therefore it is possible for a proposition to be demonstratively true or false even if there is no universal rule-set.

(At this point I'm no longer talking about objectively moral rule-sets.)

(Er... by that I mean the focus of what I'm talking about has shifted away from morality into how logical propositions [can] be members of larger sets of rules mapping one class of items to another.)

[Irouléguy] The moral organising to remove unjust rulers happens now and then, for example, in Iraq. (I am not joking.) Imposing the rule of the moral, though, is a contradiction in terms. Rule can only be imposed on an unwilling populace by killing enough of them to intimidate the rest. What is moral about that? Re your second point, you see it or you don't. That is the key difference between empirical knowledge and moral knowledge: one is demonstrable and the other is not. On your third point, why didn't the just man thump the unjust when he tried to make off with his umbrella? Sometimes crime pays and sometimes it doesn't.

[Projoy] Indeed, mugging someone cannot be demonstrated to have those negative effects upon the soul that have nothing to do with the courts. The world-view I'm arguing is one that can only be held as a matter of faith. That, it occurs to me, is what religious faith really is. It is not belief in stories about empty tombs or dictating angels; it is the belief that not only are good and evil knowable, but the knowledge is closer than your own heartbeat.
       But to return specifically to mugging, muggers are not notably well-off, materially successful people, are they, even if they never go to jail? There are no rich muggers.

ISIHAC is back, and a good one too. Carry on.

The supposed negative consequences of sin are not some sort of consolation for the good -- "he stole my wallet, but he'll burn in hell for all eternity, so that's ok". Morality only has application to oneself. Other people will do whatever they do, whatever one thinks about what they do.

[Raak] *holds his position in the discussion while he looks online for the biography of a mugger who becomes very rich*

Any chance of a recap for someone who's not been able to follow this discussion closely whilst it's been ongoing? From what I can gather my thoughts are

• What's the definition of morality? I've seen a few arguments as to what it's not, but what is it?
• Without knowing what morality is, I can't decide whether there's any sense in talking about an absolute one or not.
• What I do find interesting, though, is why people seem to have converged on having similar feelings about certain things (such as killing other people to be 'bad' [which I am happy to try and define, should that be necessary]) despite having in other ways entirely different social backgrounds and upbringing. I appreciate that there are two possible explanations for this: one, a higher "moral" force. I'm more interested in the other explanation.

But I don't want to say any of these aloud without being sure I'm not just retreading old ground.

(within, I should say, the confines of this discussion. I'm sure this ground has been trodden more generally by many others before. But few of us, presumably, were there, so...)

[Raak] Well, you're a bit unfair to say that the points I made contradict each other - I don't think there are any universally accepted moral mores, but those which are predominantly accepted can be explained in an evolutionary way. But I don't see that this is backing for your position, or as you put it, "the consequences of right and wrong action are exactly your presumed evolutionary pressures". Seems to me more reasonable to say that "right" and "wrong" are simply words that human beings have learned to apply to actions with such consequences. But if that is so, why should we do "right" and avoid "wrong"? I think this is the problem with the position you're defending, that "right" actions help the doer and "wrong" ones harm him/her. That isn't morality, it's prudence. Prudence means doing what is sensible, essentially, from one's own point of view. Many accounts of "ethics" have really been about this, the most famous being Aristotle's, which is all about how to achieve "eudaimonia" or "happiness". But this isn't what most of us understand by "morality", for two reasons. The first is that prudence often conflicts with what most people would understand as morality. For example, a soldier who throws himself on top of a grenade to save his friends is clearly not acting prudently, but most people would want to say he acts morally. Second, prudence does not have the force of imperative that I was talking about earlier. A moral value is, in some sense, a command. "Murder is wrong" means "Don't murder people!" You can ignore it or disobey it if you want, but the command still demands a response (and this, I think, for rab's benefit, must be part of the definition of a moral statement). By contrast, "If you mug people it will redound against you" isn't a command, it's simply a statement. It's not telling you to do something. What I want from a decent account of moral statements is an explanation of that imperative, and it seems to me that appealing to consequences in this way - or indeed in any way, such as that of utilitarianism - does not do this.

To put that point a slightly different way, moral values can be transgressed, whereas ones of prudence cannot. "Do not murder people" can be obeyed or disobeyed - "Murder will ultimately harm yourself" cannot.

[Projoy] Look at it this way: muggers are literally stealing people's pocket money. How is anyone going to get rich doing that?

[Raak] Whyever not? One mugger doesn't just mug one victim. They do it over and over again, as long as they don't get caught (that's probably the only practical limiting clause). There's also always the possibility they'll hit a minor jackpot, too, of someone who's carrying more than just "pocket money." I would imagine, for instance, that some of us going up to Rugby had a fair amount in cash. (As the guy collecting money for T-shirts, this is more than mere speculation!) Once they've got some money, there's no reason they couldn't invest their ill-gotten gains wisely, either, and make it grow a bit. True, I doubt most muggers are smart enough to know how to do that, but I don't think you can say it's inherently impossible to become rich through it.

[Raak] Oh, and I think you're also ignoring the way they tend to take other things the person has on them, such as credit cards, watches, jewellery, etc. The latter two probably aren't worth very much for most people (let's be honest, most people wear crap), but cards can lead to all kinds of nastily profitable shenanigans.

[Breadmaster] How about the sense of guilt? Doing something you know to be wrong makes you feel guilty. So, to put it another way, if something makes you feel guilty, it's something you feel to be immoral (this can be irrationally so, of course, insofar as any morality can be said to have a rational basis). Obviously, this isn't objective because different people feel guilt for different things.

[Darren] Ok, one can imagine how to make a lot of money at street crime, but I seriously doubt if anyone does. It's just not a real career option for anyone wanting to do more than just live hand to mouth.
[Bm] What is a "should"? What are commands? The moral person would no more thrust his hand into another's pocket than into a nest of vipers. Shoulds and commands are for those who lack insight and must be told what to do. I have not (yet) read Aristotle (is this the Nicomachean Ethics?), but morality as enlightened prudence sounds right to me.

You see - you can prove it, with one of these. You just need to know the wavelength of the light which will tell you where it is on teh spectrum which will (in most cases) be able to be proved to be a certain colour (except for those "No it's yellow" "no it's not it's orange" conversations.)

[st d] Whether you can prove it or not wasn't the point - it was whether you needed to prove it, or indeed whether you even needed to know a proof was possible.

of course - silly me.

[st d] Well done though.